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**Byron’s Posterity**

 The theme of writers’ relation to posterity (“immorality,” “fame,” the perceptions of “Futurity”) runs through *Don Juan*, and Byron continually doubts that efforts to win the attention of future generations are worthwhile. After all, “I’m Posterity—and so are you; / And whom do we remember?” (XII.19.1-2). Furthermore, references to property and to English property law are surprisingly frequent for a poem named after a famous Spanish lover: the poet refers repeatedly to heirs, debts, estates, post-obits, wills, entails, estates in fee, tenants, remainders, and reversions. These two patterns are related, I suggest; Byron’s well-known critique of pretensions to posterity’s esteem (notably, Robert Southey’s) reflects an awareness that the law of literary property, a matter of concern to authors, discriminated between posterities. Indeed, Byron envisions posterity in terms of property law: poems might be claimed as a “reversion” by some future readership, and, similarly, the awards of fame might revert to the author’s descendants. (As Blackstone explained, English law distinguishes estates in expectancy from estates in possession, and there are two kinds of estates in expectancy: a remainder, which is created by act of the parties, and a reversion, which created by act of law; Blackstone 2: 163). A reversion of acclaim is like a reversion of land—though far less dependable. I am addressing the question of “Byron Now” by examining how both Byron and the law understood what might be left to us.

“Posterity” can mean “[t]he descendants collectively of any person” or it can mean, more broadly, “all future generations of people collectively, esp. regarded as the beneficiaries of a particular inheritance, tradition, culture” (*OED*). Copyright statutes differentiate between these posterities, insofar as a copyright will pass automatically to the larger “posterity” after a specified term. When Byron wrote *Don Juan*,the copyright of a new work lasted twenty-eight years from the day of publication, and, if the author was still alive then, for the rest of his or her lifetime (Maugham 66-67). After twenty-eight years, future generations received the literary property that was due them.

Byron preferred to seize opportunities to free himself of property like county seats, coal mines, or copyrights in favor of money, which might be invested and could be freed up easily. Byron battled for years to acquire clear title to the Rochdale coal mines, but only so he could sell the Rochdale estates, and after his friend Douglas Kinnaird finally intervened and negotiated the sale of the entirety, he was instructed by Byron that the payment should be invested “in Exchequer bills—which are easily reconverted into capital—and bear also a moderate interest” (October 14, 1823; *BLJ* 11: 48).1 From a legal perspective, copyrights were personal property, like clothes, and “the author or proprietor of a book may transfer his copyright by a testamentary disposition, and in the absence of which it will pass in the same way as other kinds of personal property” (Maugham 176; Maugham observes that this principle had seldom if ever been tested in court up to this time). According to Byron’s will, made in 1815, the “interest, dividends, and annual produce” of his personal property, which would include all copyrights he had retained, would be paid to his half-sister Augusta Leigh. (If Byron made another will in 1822 or 1823, as Doris Langley Moore believes likely, he probably left untouched the main provisions of the earlier will.) In 1822 or early 1823, when he was writing the later cantos of *Don Juan*, Byron knew that if he went to Greece and died there (always possible in a war), then the copyrights of his published poetry would last until about 1852. The most valuable copyrights belonging to his estate would be his early books and his last works, which were the ones that ended up being published by John Hunt, including the later cantos of *Don Juan*. When Byron wrote Cantos VI-XVI, he knew that if he were to die, his literary property, along with the rest of his personal property, would benefit Augusta, and, if she lived to threescore and ten, dying in 1853, she would probably outlive by only a year the last copyright of his works published in his lifetime, under the law as it stood in in the 1820s. (As things turned out, she died in 1851, but, as things turned out, the copyright term had been extended, so some of the last works published in Byron’s lifetime, works John Murray bought in 1830, remained in copyright until 1866.)

References to property law are particularly common in the later cantos of *Don Juan*; moreover, nine of the fourteen references to “posterity” in Byron’s poetry occur in *Don Juan*, and six occur in Canto XII or later.2 When Byron revealed in 1822 that he had resumed *Don Juan*, beginning with Canto VI, he explained that his purpose was “To occupy my mind” and “to distract it from present things” (July 24, 1822; *BLJ* 9: 187). The “present things,” discussed at length earlier in this letter to Kinnaird, were legal complexities involving property, and although he returned to writing *Don Juan* to distract his mind, what he wrote evokes his legal and financial challenges repeatedly. The poet’s attention to property in the later cantos reflects his problems at the time he wrote them, in 1822-1823, and some of these problems he inherited: he was still battling to extricate some of the Rochdale estates from the fifth lord’s legal machinations.

Poets may aspire to literary immortality, but the literary marketplace in the Romantic Period accommodated or even encouraged the ephemeral. In 1814 the copyright term for new works was extended to twenty-eight years or the author’s lifetime (whichever was longer), but John Murray testified in 1818 before a parliamentary committee that the copyrights of only “about one in a hundred” books remained valuable more than fourteen years after publication, and therefore he usually would pay no more for twenty-eight years than if the copyright term were half as long (*Minutes* 64).3 Authors were disadvantaged because publishers saw that the sales potential of most literary works depreciated abruptly, and an author had an incentive to convince a publisher not only that his or her new work would sell well immediately, but also that the work was “one in a hundred.” While Murray acknowledged “the increased value of copyright of late years,” he said that this increase was confined “merely, or rather at least chiefly, to a few very popular authors” (*Minutes* 66). By “value” he presumably meant the overall value, which would include not only immediate sales but also the sales anticipated over the remainder of the copyright term.

Publishers and authors knew that most of the income from owning a work’s copyright was usually exhausted after a few years. Authors preferred to sell copyrights outright rather than accept a commission or divide the proceeds, and a publisher would be more apt to cooperate if the work promised to attract purchasers until the copyright term expired. Although Byron’s books often sold thousands of copies quickly, a copyright would be even more attractive to Murray if he was confident that the work would remain popular. When Kinnaird was negotiating with Murray over *Werner* early in 1823, Byron reminded Kinnaird that this copyright’s value lay not only in “*present sales*” but also in “*eight* and *twenty* years,” and, because *Werner* had already been published, Murray could extrapolate its total value: “if he has already sold six thousand (as you say) he will perhaps sell some more within 28 years” (February 6, 1823, *BLJ* 10: 96).4 Murray had testified that there were “very few books whose reputations extend beyond 14 years, so as to render them a valuable property after that period” (*Minutes* 61), and Byron thought Murray should discern that *Werner* would be one of the “very few.”5

 In 1822-23 Byron faced obstacles in making money from his poetry. Murray had bought Cantos I and II of *Don Juan* for £1,680 and had bought Cantos III, IV, and V, along with *Sardanapalus, The Two Foscari*, and *Cain*, for £2,625, but he and other publishers were unwilling or unable to buy later cantos, and so, when Cantos VI-XVI appeared, John Hunt was merely the nominal publisher, receiving fifteen percent of all proceeds while Byron was accountable for any losses. Byron’s great disadvantage in this arrangement was that he would not receive the lump payment he needed. He would get less, and would get it more slowly. Indeed, he had made only £547 14s. 10d. from *Don Juan. Cantos VI.—VII.—and VIII.* by January 15, 1824, five months after publication.6

Robert Southey, writing in the *Quarterly Review* in 1819, responded to the current state of copyright economics by invoking posterity’s wisdom. Southey acknowledged that a publisher (Murray, in fact) had testified before a parliamentary committee that “in three cases out of four” copyright “is of no value a few years after publication: at the end of fourteen years scarcely in one case out of fifty, or even out of a hundred.” Nonetheless, Southey argued, the best literature often does not win the readership and market value it deserves until long after it is published. Delayed recognition has “generally [. . .] been the case with books of the highest merit,” and the delay can be blamed on such “obstacles” as the author’s “circumstances and obscurity”; “the humour or the fashion of the times”; “the taste of the public,” which is “more likely to be erroneous than right at all times”; “and the incompetence or personal malevolence of some unprincipled critic [. . .] who, if he feels in his own heart that the fame of the man whom he hates is invulnerable, endeavours the more desperately to wound him in his fortunes.” Unable to prevent a great writer’s inevitable triumph, the critic hurts his fortunes. Yet, under “the existing law,” an author’s “representatives [. . .] are deprived of the property just when it is beginning to prove a valuable inheritance.” The current copyright statute imposed a “hardship” upon books “which win their way slowly and difficultly—but keep the field at last.” Many or most “books of the highest merit” begin to attract readers at about the time when the copyright expires (even though the public is “more likely to be erroneous than right at all times,” Southey suggests that the public tends to wise up after about three decades). On these grounds, he argued that copyright should last forever. Southey gives away the fact that his faith in posterity’s judgment, the faith that Byron satirized in *Don Juan*, was in part his reaction to legal and market realities. Literary property rights needed to last long enough to take advantage of posterity’s wisdom. If posterity will discover a poet’s worth in fifty or a hundred years, then the poet’s descendants must benefit though the poet did not. Southey argued not merely that the best literature often needs time to be appreciated, but that its owners needed time to make money off of it. He regretted that Shakespeare’s descendants were “living in poverty and in the lowest rank of life” and that “The last descendants of Milton died in poverty” even though “justice” required that they “should have possessed the perpetual copyright of their ancestors’ works,” which is “their proper and natural inheritance” (212). Southey assumed rather than argued that this inheritance was “natural.” Moreover, perpetuity of copyright had no disadvantages: “no inconvenience to literature” can “be apprehended from restoring the [. . .] common and natural right” of perpetual copyright (213).7

 Southey’s argument relies less upon the premises that literary property is property and that “property” is permanent than it relies upon his conviction that the authorship of valuable literature ought to benefit an author’s family if not the author. Southey did not distinguish the “natural inheritance” of the writer’s descendants, the focus of his concern, from the inheritance of the publisher’s successors, though, if copyright were made permanent, one consequence would be that copyrights which had been sold to a publisher, such as that of *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage*, would also last forever.8 If the law in 1603 had given Shakespeare a copyright for *Hamlet* (the Statute of Anne was not enacted until 1709), and if he sold the copyright to a publisher, then making copyright perpetual would not help his descendants. Moreover, the sum a Shakespeare or a Milton received might be small simply because immediate prospects for sales were modest and because the publisher would not gamble that the work would stand the test of time, while the author needed money immediately. One solution would be to require that assignments of copyright last only for specified period, up to a statutory maximum, after which the copyright would revert to the author’s descendants. Any argument that a publisher would pay more for a permanent copyright collides with Murray’s objection that copyrights were usually worthless after fourteen years, and, in any case, no one could predict confidently which would be those rare works that would attract readers after fifty or a hundred years.

 Murray published this number of the *Quarterly* on June 4, 1819, shortly before he published the first two cantos of *Don Juan* (on July 15). (Byron obviously could not have read Southey’s *Quarterly* article when he wrote the Dedication to *Don Juan* or the conclusion to Canto I; I do not know what Southey had heard of Byron’s as-yet-unpublished work when he wrote this article for Murray’s periodical.) Southey trusts posterity’s judgment, the same judgment he lauded in “L’Envoy” to *The Lay of the Laureate* (1816), which Byron quotes sarcastically in the final stanza of *Don Juan*, Canto I:

‘Go, little book, from this my solitude!

 I cast thee on the waters, go thy ways!

And if, as I believe, thy vein be good,

 The world will find thee after many days.’

When Southey’s read, and Wordsworth understood,

 I can’t help putting in my claim to praise—

The four first rhymes are Southey’s every line:

For God’s sake, reader! take them not for mine. (I.222)

Southey will be “read, and Wordsworth understood” at some point in the future, if they or their proponents are correct, and Byron says that his own claim to future praise is as strong, though he would never trust posterity as Southey claims to do. No author can be so confident, and certainly not Southey. In Byron’s *The Blues*, Inkel criticizes “Wordswords” and “Mouthey,” and Lady Bluemount responds that “time and posterity / Will right these great men, and this age’s severity / Become its reproach” (2.99-101). In *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* (1809), Byron wrote that Southey’s *Thalaba* “was one of those poems ‘which, in the words of [Richard] Porson, will be read when Homer and Virgil are forgotten, but—*not till then*’” (*CPW* 1: 403). Southey’s only chance lay with posterity, but posterity would neglect him as long as they remembered what great poetry was. In 1813 Byron wrote in his journal that there was “too much” Southey poetry “for the present generation,” and, unfortunately for the poet laureate, “posterity will probably select” (*BLJ* 3: 214).

In the Dedication to *Don Juan*, Byron notes Southey’s aspirations and tells him that “Scott, Rogers, Campbell, Moore, and Crabbe, will try / ’Gainst you the question with posterity” (Ded.7.7-8; *CPW*). Southey will probably lose the trial.

He that reserves his laurels for posterity

 (Who does not often claim the bright reversion?)

Has generally no great crop to spare it, he

 Being only injured by his own assertion; (Ded.9.1-4)

Southey “reserves his laurels for posterity,” and Byron can refer here to both posterities, the broader posterity that supposedly will reward Southey’s poetry with laurels and the narrower posterity that will receive the laurels (and fame and rewards) on Southey’s behalf. For Byron, this is a dubious idea because the public, even if entitled to such reversions, seldom bothers to claim them.9 Moreover, as a rule, poets who reserve their laurels for posterity will not have much to reserve. Byron acknowledges that “although here and there some glorious rarity / Arise, like Titan from the sea’s immersion,” nevertheless “The major part of such appellants go / To—God knows where—for no one else can know” (Ded.9.5-8).

 In January 1819, Byron, after being advised against publishing his new work *Don Juan*, reminded Kinnaird that he needed the payment *Don Juan* would bring, and he had “imbibed such a love for money that I keep some Sequins in a drawer to count, & cry over them once a week.” He valued “the applauses of posterity” less, and “would willingly sell the Reversion at a discount—even to Mr. Southey—who seems fond of it—as if people’s Grandchildren were to be wiser than their forefathers.”10 Byron compares the likelihood of posthumous praise to the likelihood “of the deuce-ace turning up at last—just as in the overturn of a Coach the odds are that your arse will be first out of the window” (January 27, 1819; *BLJ* 6: 98).11 Byron’s need for money eclipses any ambition concerning “the applauses of posterity.” In the Dedication to *Don Juan*, which Kinnaird had read recently, Byron satirized Southey’s overconfidence about the reversion of his poetic fame, and in this letter Byron jokes that he would sell his own reversion of posterity’s applause, for pounds sterling, to a gullible Southey.

 In Canto XII Byron writes that relying upon posterity’s applause for vindication resembles pursuing a “suit in Chancery,” in this instance a suit that “some persons plead / In an appeal to the unborn, whom they, / In the faith of their procreative creed, / Baptize Posterity.” For these litigants, such a suit is “but a dubious kind of reed / To lean on for support in any way” because “odds are that Posterity will know / No more of them, than they of her” (XII.18). This stanza reflects Byron’s preoccupation with legal battles at the time he wrote Canto XII, in October and November 1822, and indeed, it was originally preceded by a stanza, soon struck out, which noted that he had “a Chancery Suit / In right good earnest—also an Appeal / Before the Lords” (*CPW* 5: 522). Byron had appealed to the House of Lords the Court of Exchequer’s decision regarding the Rochdale coal mines (*BLJ* 9: 188, 206; 10: 46), and it appeared that he would need to sue in the Court of Chancery in order to resolve conflicts over the estate of his mother-in-law, the late Lady Noel (*BLJ* 9: 209, 213; 10: 14).

 In the fragmentary Canto XVII, Byron writes that “pages / Might be filled up, as vainly as before, / With the sad usage of all sorts of sages, / Who in his life-time, each, was deemed a Bore!” It is a fact that “The loftiest minds outrun their tardy ages,” and thus “The wise man’s sure when he no more can share it, he / Will have a firm Post Obit on posterity” (XVII.9). Just as moneylenders holding a post-obit can claim payment from the heir (with interest) after the heir inherits, the wise man can claim his payment when his worldly goods have passed to his descendants. It is true that wisdom often is not appreciated until later, but this fact is of no practical consequence.

When Southey argued that permanent copyright threatened “no inconvenience to literature,” he was blind to several inconveniences, such as the problem posed by dormant copyrights. Southey did not consider what would happen if his own works were to be forgotten and then rediscovered in the 1920s, and no one could locate the copyright-owners in order to get permission to publish. Property rights include control, and copyright-owners can forbid publication as well as profit from it (no news to Southey, who two years earlier tried to suppress his own *Wat Tyler*!). If copyright were perpetual, his descendants could as easily prevent re-publication of his poems as make money from them. If in 2015 Byron’s works remained under copyright, what would occur if the copyright belonged to a descendant of Augusta Leigh who had no interest in authorizing publication, or, worse, wished to suppress Byron’s works, perhaps because their sordidness reflected on the family?

 After Murray turned down Cantos VI-IX in October 1822, *Don Juan* was split between two owners, and because its commercial value was greatest if it were published as a whole, as Byron’s executors and Murray perceived after Byron’s death, then at some point the copyrights would need to be unified, and in 1830 Murray paid £4,210 for all of the Byron estate’s identifiable copyrights, including the later cantos. When a literary work was published over a number of years, the date of the final part was crucial if customers would insist upon having the entire work. Although the copyright of the first two cantos of *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage* expired in 1840, they were worth little while Murray still owned the remaining two, and so prospective publishers had to wait until Canto IV entered the “public domain” (and, because of the 1842 copyright statute, it did not do so until 1860). On the same principle, Murray’s ownership of the sixteen cantos of *Don Juan* really lasted until the copyright of Cantos XV and XVI expired in 1866.

 I mentioned earlier that a poet’s copyrights pass automatically to the broader of the two “posterities” at the end of a term specified by statute. When Murray paid for Byron copyrights in the period 1814 to 1822, he was uncertain how many years each copyright would last, though the provisions of the 1814 copyright statute gave him good reason to wish that the poet would live for perhaps another forty years (and remain popular). In contrast, when Murray bought the Byron estate’s remaining copyrights in 1830, he knew precisely when each would expire, given the current law, because Byron had clarified everything by dying five years earlier. As soon as Byron was dead, his copyrights suddenly were limited to twenty-eight years from the day of publication. The copyright term was extended in 1842, but by 1867 all of Byron’s most significant poetry had entered the public domain.

 Ownership of most personal property (including manuscripts or books) is perpetual, and it can contribute perpetually to restricting access to material texts. After all, it makes a difference whether the only copy of a book is owned by the British Library or by an eccentric duke. After July 1830, possession of Byron’s “works” was centralized, but possession of their key physical manifestations, including manuscripts and proofs, was scattered. As Mark Rose has shown, Lord Hardwicke in *Pope v. Curll* (1741) introduced a distinction that has been central to copyright law ever since: the distinction between the ownership of literary property, which is incorporeal property or what came to be called “intellectual” property, and the ownership of material embodiments of literary works, such as manuscripts and printed books.12 It was the Hardwicke’s precedent that in 1824 enabled Byron’s executors to prevent publication of some Byron letters even though the manuscripts indisputably belonged to Robert Charles Dallas or his son (*Hobhouse and Hanson v. Dallas, Knight, and Colburn*, Chancery, 1824). Hardwicke’s rulingand its progeny meant that a person might own the only physical embodiment of a work but not own the work’s copyright, or might own a copyright but not own a single physical copy. Someone might own the only holograph manuscript of a Byron poem without acquiring any right to print the poem. After 1830, Murray often faced the converse problem: he owned the copyright of almost every identifiable Byron poetic work, and while he owned or could acquire physical copies of each of them, he did not own all the physical embodiments of these works that he needed to make use of in order to get the most out of ownership of the copyright. He owned the abstract ideal state of the poem, but he did not own or have possession of all the relevant textual authorities; for example, purchase of the copyright did not entitle him to see every manuscript.

 A key moment in the afterlife of an important author is reached when almost all the relevant surviving material evidence becomes available to scholars. For example, by some point in the early twentieth century almost all the material manifestations of Shakespeare were gathered in a relatively small number of well-known research libraries and archives. Byron is now approaching this point, in part because of the National Library of Scotland’s acquisition of the John Murray Archive, in part because of digitalization projects that will include Byron’s manuscripts and books. In a real sense, only now can something like Byron’s entire corpus be available to posterity.

Notes

1 James Dearden (or “Deardon”) purchased “certain premises and coal-mines in the manor of Rochdale” (103 Eng. Rep. 337) from the fifth lord in 1796 for £510 (146 Eng. Rep. 1251), but the latter had signed a deed in 1773 that arguably reduced him to a tenant for life, and, if so, he could not sell (146 Eng. Rep. 1253). When Lord Byron, the poet, attempted to reclaim this land, the key question was whether in 1796 his predecessor owned the properties outright. Byron succeeded in recovering the lands in the Court of King’s Bench in 1807 (*Keene d. Byron et al. v. Deardon et al.*, King’s Bench, 1807, 8 East 248-67, 103 Eng. Rep. 336-44), but Dearden and others were granted a temporary injunction by the Court of Exchequer, and in 1820 the Chief Baron of that court ruled that the 1796 sale was valid(*Dearden et al. v. Byron et al. (*Exchequer, 1820, 8 Price 417-66; 146 Eng. Rep. 1249-65). Byron appealed to the House of Lords, and the “case” submitted to the House of Lords on Dearden’s behalf is in JMA 43758. This litigation was costly: solicitors John and Charles Hanson charged Byron £590 for their efforts in this case alone in 1821-1822 (Kinnaird to Byron, late December 1822, JMA 43456). With Byron’s permission, Kinnaird took the initiative by negotiating directly with Dearden, and in 1824 all the Rochdale estates were sold to Dearden for £11,250.

 2 Obviously, each reference to posterity in *Don Juan* alludes to the beginning of the first canto, where the poet echoes Horace’s observation that “Brave men were living before Agamemnon” but they are forgotten because their achievements were not recorded by a bard. Though Horace is correct, Byron declines to immortalize one of his age’s heroes, devoting his efforts instead to “our ancient friend Don Juan” (I.1.6).

3 Until 1814, the copyright of a new book lasted fourteen years from publication, after which it reverted to the author, if he or she was still living, for another fourteen-year term (Maugham 24).

4 Or over a longer period, if Byron lived past sixty-three.

5 Murray published *Werner* in November 1822, yet sixteen months laterKinnaird was informing Byron that there would “always be time enough” to settle with Murray because Byron’s “claim [was] not weakened or lessen’d by time” (Kinnaird to Byron, March 19, 1824; JMA 43456). Byron died soon after receiving Kinnaird’s letter, and the copyright of *Werner* belonged to the poet’s estate until 1830, before which *Werner* was available from both of Byron’s official publishers: John Hunt included it in his collections of Byron’s recent works.

6 Byron was due £599 15s. 5d. before £52 0s. 7d. in legal expenses were deducted (JMA 43554).

7 Southey quotes Lord Mansfield saying that he “never heard any inconvenience objected to literary property, but that of *enhancing the price* of books” (211n).

 8 Similarly, the ills of which Southey complained would not be cured simply by reversing the House of Lords’ decision in *Donaldson v. Becket* (1774) that the copyrights of published books terminated at the end of the statutory term. Most of the supposedly perpetual copyrights at issue in *Donaldson* belonged to publishers.

9 Reading proof, Byron added the question mark after “reversion,” which was then ignored in every edition before Jerome McGann’s in 1986. In the manuscripts, the poet indicates that posterity does not often claim the reversion, whereas Byron’s proof version indicates (sarcastically) that no one does not claim the reversion, meaning (sarcastically) that everyone entitled to the reversion takes possession of it.

10 In dismissing posterity, Byron may be responding to Hobhouse’s comment that aspects of *Don Juan*, Canto I, “will really injure your reputation both as a man and a poet” (*BB* 258).

11 As Andrew Bennett observes, “The legal rhetoric of posthumous fame as a ‘Reversion,’ which [also] appears in the ‘Dedication’ to *Don Juan*, ironises and deflates the importance of the textual afterlife, making of it a transferable quality, equivalent to a ‘sequin’ in a financial transaction” (Bennett 192).

 12 *Pope v. Curl* (sic; 1741), 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608; and Mark Rose, “The Author in Court: *Pope v. Curll*,” in Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, ed., *The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature* (Durham: Duke UP, 1994) 211-29.

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*CPW* Lord Byron. *The Complete Poetical Works*. Ed. Jerome J. McGann, 7 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980-93.

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JMA John Murray Archive, National Library of Scotland

Maugham Robert Maugham. *A Treatise on the Laws of Literary Property, Comprising the Statutes and Cases Relating to Books, Manuscripts, Lectures, Dramatic and Musical Compositions; Engravings, Sculpture, Maps, Etc. Including the Piracy and Transfer of Copyright; with an Historical View, and Disquisitions on the Principles and Effects of the Law*. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1828.

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